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Bates and O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona: From
the Court to the Bar to the Consumer
INTRODUCTION
On February 22, 1976, the Legal Clinic of Bates and O'Steen
placed an advertisement in a local newspaper as a knowing chal-
lenge' to the profession's historical ban on attorney advertising.
2
Each side in the resulting disciplinary action urged that it had the
public interest at heart. Nevertheless, the widely differing percep-
tions of advertising within the profession so colored the debate that
it became clear that interests beyond that of the public were being
protected. Proponents of the ban argued that it prevented fraud and
deception of the public and preserved the dignity of the profession.
Opponents focused on advertising as an informative rather than a
persuasive device; they contended that the ban interfered with the
flow of commercial information to the consumer and with the pro-
fession's responsibility to make legal counsel available.
In Bates and O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona,' the Supreme Court
offered something to both sides. In holding that a newspaper adver-
tisement listing prices for routine legal services was constitutionally
protected speech, the Court necessitated changes in the organized
bar's position. The ruling opens up the flow of information about
lawyers' fees and encourages alternatives in the delivery and use of
legal services. At the same time, the Court recognized the legitimate
use of regulations to prevent fraud and deception of the public. The
response of the American Bar Association (ABA) and state regula-
tory agencies to the Bates decision will determine whether the pub-
lic interest is really served.
This article explores the development of the legal profession's ban
on advertising and the constitutional doctrine of commercial free
speech upon which the Bates decision rested. The Court's analysis
that found justifications for the ban insufficient is also examined.
Finally, it discusses recent amendments to the ABA's Code of Pro-
1. As later stipulated, the advertisement was a knowing violation of disciplinary rule 2-
101(B), embodied in rule 29a of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. (1976
Supp.), p. 26.
2. Advertising and solicitation of clients are seen as closely related. For purposes of defini-
tion, "advertisement" is "[ilnformation communicated to the public..." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 74 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). To "solicit" is a more individualized activity and "implies
personal petition and importunity addressed to a particular person to do a particular thing."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1564 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). This comment concerns advertising al-
though the decision does have implications for solicitation.
3. 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
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fessional Responsibility which were adopted4 in response to the
Bates decision.
THE ADVERTISING BAN
A substantial part of the argument3 presented by the appellant
bar in Bates was based on the historical role and discipline of the
profession. The practice of law developed from a concept of profes-
sional dignity and responsibility rather than from business competi-
tiveness. The fundamental premise often articulated in state court
disciplinary actions7 was that the practice of law was a "profession"
and not a "trade." As one court explained it, "the basic ideal of that
profession is to render service and secure justice for those seeking
its aid. It is not a business, using bargain counter methods to reap
large profits for those who conduct it."' The professional character-
istic of public service was reaffirmed in the methods used by early
courts to control the manner in which lawyers practiced.'
Yet the advertising ban, and even codes of ethics,"0 are recent
developments in the history of the law. Although early works on
professional ethics" did not specifically address advertising, self-
4. The amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter cited as the
Code] were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates at an annual meeting held in Chicago
on August 10, 1977. Chicago Daily Law Bull., August 11, 1977, at 1, col. 3. The amendments
were adopted less than two months after the decision with both consumer groups and oppo-
nents of the amendments urging deferral. Consumers wanted to see how the market and the
profession would react in an atmosphere of non-regulation and opponents felt that guidelines
exceeded the Supreme Court ruling. ABA, Dvn. of Communications, release 081677s (8/9/77).
5. The Bates decision gives the strongest arguments for the ban. See text accompanying
notes 73 through 104 infra. The purpose of this section is, therefore, to give a brief history of
the organized bar's approach to advertising.
6. The men who learned the law by appearing at the Inns of Court were generally well-
to-do and were not concerned with earning a livelihood. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 210-
11 (1953); M. OKIN, LEGAL ETHICs 3-8 (1957).
7. Mayer v. State Bar of Cal., 2 Cal. 2d 71, 39 P.2d 206 (1934); In re Cohen, 261 Mass.
484 (1928); In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953).
8. Mayer v. State Bar of Cal., 2 Cal. 2d 71, 39 P.2d 206, 208 (1934). Accord, Comment,
Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints on Advertising and Solicitation by Attorneys, 62 VA.
L. REV. 1135, 1151 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Restraints on Advertising].
9. The common law controlled lawyers' conduct through the crimes of barratry (the of-
fense of frequently exciting or stirring up litigation), champerty (supporting litigation in
which one was not a party upon agreement to share the proceeds), and maintenance (main-
taining, supporting, or promoting the litigation of another). See generally Restraints on
Advertising, supra note 8, at 1137; E. Smith, Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal
Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available," 48 TEx. L. REV. 285
(1970); Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1189 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Availablel.
10. The first ethics code adopted in America was that of the Alabama bar in 1887. See
Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, supra note 9, at 1182 n.5, citing H. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHIcs 23 (1953).
11. George Sharswood's Essay on Professional Ethics, first published in 1854, is consid-
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laudation and the active search for clients were discouraged. Canon
27 of the first Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted by the ABA
in 1907, contained a partial ban on advertigingI2 that arose out of a
fear that the profession was becoming increasingly commercial-
ized.'3 The ABA was also concerned that unscrupulous attorneys
were misleading the public through inflated claims of legal skills."
But it was not publicity that was seen as the evil; rather, it was the
use of commercial methods which the ban addressed. While other
businessmen increasingly relied on advertising to promote their
products, the legal profession moved in the opposite direction.
In retrospect, others see a less altruistic motive in Canon 27. ', The
real catalyst may have been fear of litigation of causes unpopular
to the establishment-segregation, landlord-tenant, and consumer-
manufacturer disputes. Without advertising, the people most likely
to initiate such actions were left without the information necessary
to locate attorneys willing to represent them."' The ban affected the
ered as heavily influencing the first Canons. In fact, it was reprinted by the ABA at the time
the first Canons were adopted. 32 REP. OF THE AMERICAN BAR Ass'N (5th ed. 1907). But see J.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976), where the author finds the essay "at best, antiquated; at
worst, irrelevant." Id. at 41.
12. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 27 read in part:
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of
personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se impro-
per. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements or by personal com-
munications, or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofes-
sional. . . Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concern-
ing the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the im-
portance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the tradi-
tions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
For example, a legitimate news story could be acceptable but encouraging such a story was
not. This rule, however, was not consistently enforced. Compare In re Connelly, 18 App. Div.
2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963) with Florida Bar v. Nichols, 151 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1963).
13. See In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933); Restraints on Advertising,
supra note 8, at 1138. See generally Recent Developments in Attorney's Fees, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 685, 697 (1976).
14. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 112 (1953); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHICS IN AN ADVER-
SARY SYSTEM 114 (1975); cf. Semler v. Oregon Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611
(1935) (misleading clients as a basis for state regulation).
15. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 41 (1976), noting that in 1905, President
Roosevelt rebuked attorneys who assisted corporate clients in evading new regulatory legisla-
tion. The ABA responded by developing standards reflecting the influence and position of the
bar. But once the bar associations became involved in the campaign for ethical codes, corpo-
rate lawyers, who were disproportionately represented on bar councils, shifted the onus to
"ambulance chasers" who were disproportionately excluded.
16. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 42-43 (1976); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 118 (1975). See also Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services
for the Middle Class, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (1963); Comment, Bar Restrictions on Dissemina-
tion of Information about Legal Services, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 483, 500 (1974); Recent Develop-
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urban lawyer and his potential blue-collar clientele rather than the
established firm representing the well-to-do or corporate clients.
In 1970 the Canons were replaced by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 7 The Code introduced a new concept in Canon 2:
the duty to make legal services available. 8 This marked a transition
from a passive lawyer-client relationship to an active professional
obligation to make legal services available. Disciplinary Rule
(DR)2-101 (B),19 however, banned all advertising except office signs,
phone number listings, and ordinary business cards. The rule sus-
tained the traditional model of lawyer waiting for client and re-
stricted lawyers who wanted to use new approaches that might in-
crease consumer awareness of the availability of legal services. This
inconsistency between the goal of Canon 2 and the means of imple-
menting it was the issue faced in Bates.
The ABA again amended the Code in 1976.20 Under an addition
ments in Attorney's Fees, 29 VAND. L. REv. 685, 709 (1976); Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, supra note 9, at 1189.
17. The ABA Code of' Professional Responsibility became effective on January 1, 1970.
The new Code consists of Canons, Ethical Considerations [EC], and Disciplinary Rules
[DRI. Canons express in general the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers.
Ethical considerations are objectives and constitute principles which can guide the lawyer.
Disciplinary rules, unlike the EC's, are mandatory in character and represent the "minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."
The Code is designed to be adopted by the appropriate state agencies responsible for lawyer
discipline. ABA Code, IC (1970).
18. ABA Code, Canon 2 (1970): "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession In Fulfilling
its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." EC 2-1 states:
The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize
their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able
to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel. Hence, important functions of the
legal profession are to educate laymen to recognize their legal problems, to facilitate
the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services
fully available.
EC 2-9, ABA Code (1976) on the other hand, states: "The traditional ban against advertising
by lawyers, which is subject to certain limited exceptions, is rooted in the public interest.
Competitive advertising would encourage extravagant, artful, and self-laudatory brashness
in seeking business and thus could mislead the layman."
19. DR 2-101(B) states in part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine adver-
tisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in city or
telephone directories, or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he author-
ize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
There is an exception for qualified legal assistance programs allowing them to use means of
dignified commercial publicity. See generally Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, supra
note 9, at 1181 (advertising by legal aid services).
20. The amendments may have come as a result of pressure from various sources. Gold-
farb v. State Bar of Va., 421 U.S. 773 (1975), had been decided only a few months earlier,
subjecting the legal profession to antitrust laws for the first time. Other actions had been filed
seeking injunctive relief from the disciplinary rules. Consumers Union of the United States,
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to the disciplinary rules,"' attorneys were permitted to supply infor-
mation to the yellow pages and law lists, including office hours, fees
for initial consultation, and the acceptance of credit cards. At the
time of the Bates and O'Steen advertisement, however, only three
states had adopted these provisions.22
The Bates Advertisement
John Bates and Van O'Steen, attorneys licensed to practice in
Arizona, operated a legal clinic providing legal services "at moder-
ate fees to persons of moderate incomes who did not qualify for
governmental legal aid."23 In order to attract the clients necessary
to their practice, they placed a newspaper advertisement offering
routine legal services at reasonable rates. 4 For this violation of the
Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, Civil No. 75-0105R (E.D. Va. filed 2/27/75), 45 U.S.L.W. 2309
(12/17/76).
21. DR 2-102(A)(6) permits "a listing in a reputable law list, legal directory, a directory
published by a state, county or local bar association, or the classified section of telephone
company directories giving brief biographical data." The data may include only the following:
name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates; addresses
and telephone numbers; one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm
concentrates, to the extent not prohibited by the authority having jurisdiction
under state law over the subject; a statement that practice is limited to one or more
fields of law, to the extent not prohibited by the authority having jurisdiction under
state law over the subject of limitation of practice by lawyers; a statement that the
lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law or law practice, to the
extent permitted by the authority having jurisdiction under state law over the
subject of specialization by lawyers and in accordance with rules prescribed by that
authority; date and place of birth; date and place of admission to the bar of state
and federal courts; schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees, and other
scholastic distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; military service; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships, offices, committee
assignments, and section memberships in bar associations; memberships and off-
ices in legal fraternities and legal societies; technical and professional licenses;
memberships in scientific, technical, and professional association and societies;
foreign language ability; names and addresses of references, and with their consent,
names of clients regularly represented; whether credit cards or other credit arrange-
ments are accepted; office and other hours of availability; a statement of legal fees
fbr an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of
fees to be charged for the specific services.
22. Lawscope, 63 A.B.A.J. 299 (1977). Maine, Michigan and Oklahoma had amended
their regulations although only Maine went as far as the amendments allowed. Arizona, the
state in which Bates and O'Steen practiced, had not adopted the 1976 amendments at the
time the ad was placed.
23. 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2694 (1977).
24. Their practice was limited to routine legal matters such as simple personal bankrupt-
cies, uncontested divorces, name changes, and the like so that through the use of paralegals
and standardized forms and procedures, costs could be minimized. The ad, run in a local
daily newspaper, listed the following services-uncontested divorce or separation, uncon-
tested adoption, non-business bankruptcy, change of name-and the prices listed for each.
Id. at 2694.
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Arizona Supreme Court rules disciplinary action was commenced.2"
After recommendation of a six month suspension by the State Bar,
the case was brought on review to the Arizona Supreme Court." The
court found the attorneys guilty but sanctioned only censure. 27 The
Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction2 8 of
two issues:29
1. Does a total ban on advertising by private attorneys, origi-
nated by the ABA and incorporated into a rule of the Arizona
Supreme Court, violate the Sherman Act notwithstanding the
state action exemption of Parker v. Brown?30
2. Does such a ban, enforced by an integrated state bar and state
supreme court, violate the first amendment?
THE ANTITRUST ISSUE
Opponents of the advertising ban claimed that it was a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 3 because it constituted
25. See note 35 infra.
26. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
27. The Arizona Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion. Although one justice styled
himself a dissent, he concurred with the finding of a violation and objected only to not
maintaining the six month suspension. Id. at 402, 555 P.2d at 648 (Hays, J., dissenting).
28. 429 U.S. 813 (1976).
29. There were other issues before the Arizona court. In addition to the two for which
review was granted, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the ban on the grounds of state
antitrust violation, equal protection, and as a statute void for vagueness. In re Bates, 113 Ariz.
394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976). The issues for which appeal was granted were in the alternative. In
order to find an antitrust violation there must have been no state action; in order to find a
first or fourteenth amendment violation, there must have been state action. One commenta-
tor states, however, that the definition of "state action" is not the same in first amendment
and antitrust cases. See Martyn, Lawyer Advertising: The Unique Relationship between First
Amendment and Anti-Trust Protections, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 197-98 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Martyni.
30. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
31. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1955) states: "Every contract, combina-
tion. . .or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states. . .is hereby
declared to be illegal..." Violations fall into two categories: per se violations and unreasona-
ble restraints. Prior to United States v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 221 U.S. 1 (1910), all
restraints of trade were per se violations of the Sherman Act. In Standard Oil, the Court
applied a rule of reason, so construing the Act that all contracts or combinations which
amount to an unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce are illegal. The
rule's standard is one of commercial reasonableness rather than societal reasonableness.
Accord, L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 194 (1977).
Price-fixing, because it is inherently anti-competitive, is the classic example of a per se
violation. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 237 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1926); Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1974). See Restraints on Advertising, supra note 8,
at 1143-44; Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: the Implica-
tions of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 475, 500 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Branca & Stein-
bergl.
The analysis performed by the courts is limited to the facts, for once an arrangement has
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illegal price fixing.3" The Supreme Court, as had the Arizona court,
summarily disposed of this issue by relying on the state action ex-
emption. In Parker v. Brown,3 the Court held that the Sherman Act
was not applicable to anti-competitive activities directed by the
state as sovereign." The Court found the conduct in Bates within
this rule since to practice law in Arizona attorneys had to be
licensed members of the Arizona Supreme Court-created and
-controlled State Bar."5 The advertising ban contained in the 1970
been characterized as price-fixing, the per se doctrine relieves the court of the need to com-
pare possible benefits or harms. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.,
339 U.S. 485, 489 (1949). See generally L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 199 (1977).
32. Price need not be fixed in a rigid sense; it is sufficient that the purpose and effect of
an agreement among competitors is to stabilize prices. United States v. Container Corp. of
America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc., 285 F.2d 688,
691 (7th Cir. 1961). See also Branca and Steinberg, supra note 31, at 497. The advertising
ban's opponents feel the agreement not to release price information prevents the consumer
of legal services from comparing prices. The ban may make it more difficult for new attorneys
to attract clients. Thus, the ban reduces the competitive incentive among lawyers. Accord,
R. Arnould and R. Corley, Fee Schedt,es Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J. 655 (1971);
Branca and Steinberg, supra note 31, at 510-12; R. Hummel, Antitrust Problems of Industry
Codes of Advertising, Standardization, and Seals of Approval, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 607 (1968);
Martyn, supra note 29, at 174. A ban similar to the ABA's was found to be a per se violation
of the Sherman Act in United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc., 285 F.2d 688, 691 (7th
Cir. 1961), notwithstanding that the agreement was rationalized as one protecting the public.
33. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
34. The Court in Parker stated:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature. . . . The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state
as such and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state.
Id. at 350-51. The exemption was limited, for the state could not authorize private violations
of the Act nor could mere participation by the state in private actions be sufficient to grant
immunity. Id. at 351.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court found the
minimum fee schedule of a local bar association to constitute illegal price-fixing. Defendant
argued that the Parker exemption applied where the private action was "prompted" by the
State; however, the Court found this relationship inadequate as "anti-competitive activities
must be compelled by the state acting as sovereign." Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), the Court again examined state action
immunity in holding that the mere fact that private conduct will be subject to state regulation
is not enough to confer immunity. Id. at 592-93. It implied a balancing of state and federal
interests in the anti-competitive activity, and that the state interest must be significant to
survive when inconsistent with federal antitrust regulation.
Bates seems to give renewed vigor to state action immunity. The Bates analysis focused
on the relationship of the defendant to the state rather than on the implicit balancing of the
state interest in relation to the federal interest. The Bates Court apparently rejected the
necessity of significant state interest by hinting a different outcome would have occured in
Cantor had the state regulatory commission rather than the private instigator of the anti-
competitive activity been the party defendant. 97 S.Ct. at 2779. This leads to the conclusion
that where a sufficiently close relationship to the state is proved, immunity will be extended
without a final balancing of federal and state interests.
35. Rule 27(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona reads in part:
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Code was part of the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court and thus
was conduct mandated by the state. By applying the Parker exemp-
tion, the Court left states free to impose restrictions on advertising
even though the charges of price-fixing may remain:"
COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH
Historical Development
The key to the Bates decision is its first amendment analysis.
Freedom of expression is fundamental to the American system of
government. 7 The constitution guarantees broad protection to the
flow of ideas on political, social and economic matters.38 Freedom
1. In order to advance the administration of justice according to law . . . the
Supreme Court of Arizona does hereby perpetuate, create, and continue under
direction and control of this Court an organization known as the State Bar of
Arizona, and all persons now or hereafter licensed in this state to engage in the
practice of law shall be members of the State Bar of Arizona in accordance with
the rules of this Court.
Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona provides in part: "The duties and obligations of
members of the bar shall be prescribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association..." For the text of the Code, see note 19 supra. Bates was decided
outside of the framework of the 1976 amendments. The challenged rule, DR 2-101(B) is now
amended and identical to the 1976 Code provisions. 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2697 n.12.
36. It is doubtful that the Court will ever reach the issue of the advertising ban as a per
se violation. State action immunity would not be present in a suit against the ABA, and
United States v. American Bar Association, Civ. Action no. 76-1182 (D.D.C. 1976) was to be
such a test. The question may be moot by virtue of the recent Code amendments. There is
authority stating that such a deliberate change in an association's policy will avoid liability.
United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 334 (1952).
As for the state's interest in price-fixing, the Court inferred in Bates that a state may be
able to mandate such an anti-competitive result:
Indeed, our decision today on the Sherman Act issue was presaged in Virginia
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). We noted
there: "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its
pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other
ways."
97 S.Ct. at 2698 n.16. This language is interpreted as allowing the ABA to recommend, and
the states to adopt, reasonable regulations of price advertising post-Bates.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2: "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press."
38. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940):
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the constitution embraces
at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public
concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigen-
cies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive admin-
istration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply
the public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues
of the times. . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
Such protection is exemplified by the "overbreadth" doctrine. This first amendment doc-
trine is a departure from the general rule that a person may not challenge the constitution-
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of speech is not, however, an "unlimited license to talk.""' False,
misleading or untruthful speech has never been protected for its own
sake'0 and some regulation is permitted to protect significant gov-
ernment interests." Reasonable regulation as to time, place, and
manner of speech is permitted; however, such regulation must leave
open alternative channels for constitutionally protected communi-
cations."2 In addition, any regulation that operates as a prior re-
straint" of speech is regarded by the Court as having a heavy pre-
sumption against validity."
Until recently, the constitutional protection afforded political,
social, and economic ideas did not extend to speech of a purely
commercial nature. In 1942, the Supreme Court stated emphatically
in Valentine v. Christensen,' that the constitution did not restrain
governmental regulation of purely commercial advertising. Since
ality of a statute on grounds other than those before the court. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U.S. 601, 610-12 (1973); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). Although the Court refused to apply the overbroadth doctrine in Bates, it
stated that
the reason for the special rule in first amendment cases is apparent; an overbroad
statute might serve to chill protected speech. . . The use of overbreadth analysis
reflects the conclusion that the possible harm to society from allowing unprotected
speech to go unpublished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech will
be muted.
97 S.Ct. at 2707.
39. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961). Speech may be limited in two
ways: (1) certain forms of speech (e.g., libel, obscenity) or speech in certain contexts: and
(2) where the regulation is not intended to control the content but is incidental to free
exercise.
40. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
366 U.S. 36, 49 & 61 n.10 (1961). Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1940) (illegal activity). See generally R. Rotunda, The Corn mer-
cial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080.
41. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 336 U.S. 36, 50 (1961); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963). Accord, Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963). See generally
Martyn, supra note 29, at 189; Comment, Bar Restrictions on Dissemination of Information
About Legal Services, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 483, 508 (1974); cf. United Mine Workers v. Illinois
State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (minimum rationale).
42. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 296 (1974); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Accord, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943). See generally Note,
Commercial Speech: The Court Sends Another Valentine to Advertisers, 25 BUFFALO L. REV.
737, 747 (1976).
43. "The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either
directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination
that it is unprotected by the First Amendment." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1940); see, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975).
44. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); N.Y. Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
45. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The owner of a submarine had attempted to distribute a handbill
advertising the boat in violation of a local sanitary code that forbade distribution on the
streets of commercial and business advertising matter.
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the advertisement at issue there did not have the requisite relation-
ship to the exchange of ideas, the Valentine Court did not see it as
within the scope of the first amendment.
While this view survived until 1970,46 it was encroached upon by
an expanding interpretation of the first amendment. Three strands
in this development are important to the Bates decision. First, the
Supreme Court held that speech did not lose first amendment pro-
tection merely because money was spent to project it 7 or because it
was carried in a form that was sold.4" Thus, the form standard of
Valentine was rejected in favor of a "content" standard: if commer-
cial speech is protected, it is because the content is protected rather
than because it appeared in commercial form.4" Second, the Court
extended first amendment protection where speech benefitted the
exercise of other constitutionally protected rights. O
Finally, in a series of first amendment cases, the Court defined
certain peripheral rights. Included under the rubric of free speech
and press was not only the right to utter or to print, "but the right
to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read . . . and freedom
of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach . . .,"I' The
Court held that without these peripheral rights the specific rights
would be less secure. Thus the Court interpreted the right to speak
to be complemented by a willing listener's right to receive; 2 ulti-
mately, the right of the listener and not the speaker could control
the decision. 53 Of the three strands, this aspect was most instrumen-
tal in the development of modern commercial speech protection.
46. The holding of Valentine was questioned during this time. See Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 398 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
47. Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1 (1976); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66
(1964); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384
(1973).
48. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952).
49. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). Accord, Note, Professional Advertising Ban Yields to Consumer Right to Know:
Speech Granted First Amendment Protection, 8 SEroN HALL L. REv. 67, 71 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Consumer Right to Know].
50. Accord, United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (Murphy, J., concurring).
51. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). Accord, Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1939).
52. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
756-57 (1976); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943). Accord, Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 510, 515 (1946); see Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, supra note 9, at
1186.
53. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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These views of commercial speech development merged in
Bigelow v. Virginia,54 when the Supreme Court held that first
amendment guarantees of speech and press were applicable to paid
commercial advertising."5 Some courts and commentators view that
decision as granting blanket protection to commercial speech."
However, Bigelow confronted an advertisement which incorporated
elements of the more traditional forms of protection-it conveyed
information relevant to the distinct constitutional right to abor-
tion.5 Arguably, the decision was within the framework of protect-
ing political and social ideas rather than simple commercial pro-
nouncements. If the content standard was expanded by Bigelow,
it went only so far as to protect commercial enterprises related to
some area of public and constitutional concern.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.," the Court finally addressed the issue of first
amendment protection for commercial advertisement unrelated to
other rights. 9 The Court cleared up the ambiguity created by
Bigelow by holding that pure, everyday commercial information was
within the protection of the first amendment. The nexus to constitu-
tionally protected social, economic, and political ideas was not es-
sential; it was sufficient that the consumer have a significant inter-
est in the communication.
54. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
55. Id. at 818.
56. The Virginia Pharmacy Court stated that with Bigelow, "the notion of unprotected
'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene." 425 U.S. 748, 7.59 (1976). See Comment,
Commercial Speech: The Supreme Court Sends Another Valentine to Advertisers, 25 BUFFALO
L. REV. 737 (1976); Comment, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: An Emerging
Doctrine, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655 (1977). Accord, Recent Developments in Attorney's Fees, 29
VAND. L. REV. 685, 700 (1976).
57. The ad promoted a service that would arrange low-cost abortions in New York; there
was no residency requirement. At the time, abortions were not legal in Virginia.
58. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Consumers of prescription drugs brought suit challenging the
validity under the first and fourteenth amendments of a Virginia statute declaring it unpro-
fessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the price of prescription drugs.
59. Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject. . . He does not
wish to report any particular newsworthy fact, or to make any generalized observa-
tions even about commercial matters. The "idea" he wishes to communicate is
simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price."
Id. at 761.
60. The Court stated:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information,
that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far than his interest in the day's most
urgent political debate. . . Those whom the supression of prescription drug price
information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A
disproportionate amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs;
yet they are least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where
their scarce dollars are best spent. When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do,
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The kind of price advertising contained in Bates was not included
in the public interest analysis used to hold drug price advertising
permissible in Virginia Pharmacy. First, the goods purchased in
Virginia Pharmacy were standardized whereas Bates dealt with an
individualized service; moreover, access to the goods in Virginia
Pharmacy was controlled by someone other than the advertiser'
whereas no middleman exists between attorney and client. 2 The
Court in Virginia Pharmacy indicated its awareness of these signifi-
cant differences in a footnote:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of
commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no
opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and
functional, between professions, may require consideration of quite
different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dis-
pense standardized products; they render professional services of
almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake
certain kinds of advertising.13
Although regulations of speech must generally be justified with-
out reference to content, 4 the Supreme Court recognizes that the
content of the communication may affect the measure of protection
afforded to the speech.15 Commercial speech is perceived as a har-
dier version of speech. Since advertising is the sine qua non of com-
mercial profits, the Court has found it less likely to disappear in the
information as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could
mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.
Id. at 763-64.
61. Access to the drugs was controlled by the doctor; therefore, the Court saw less chance
for fraud on the part of the pharmacist. Id. at 766 n.21.
62. Some proponents of the advertising ban see it as performing the same function. When
the most frequently used manner of finding an attorney is word of mouth, there is an inferred
evaluation on the part of the recommending party. See H. DruNKER, LEGAL Emics 218-19
(1953); cf. Restraints on Advertising, supra note 8, at 1153 (attorney reputation); W. Smith,
Making the Availability of Legal Services Better Known, 62 A.B.A.J. 855, 860-61 (1976)
(alternatives to advertising). In Restraints on Advertising, supra note 8, at 1153, the author
cites a survey indicating that 48.7% of the legal clientele chose their first attorney on the basis
of a referral. This is not suprising considering that it is one of the very few ways to select a
lawyer. This author also discusses reasons why such a referral may not be an objective picture
of the lawyer's skills.
63. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 773 n.25 (1976).
64. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Accord, United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
65. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Accord, Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584, aff'd without opinion 405 U.S. 1000
(1971); cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting regulations).
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face of proper regulation than other forms of speech." In weighing
regulations restricting the exercise of commercial free speech, the
Court has developed a balancing test.67 The critical question in
Bates was whether the good resulting from the free flow of commer-
cial information to the consumer of legal services outweighed the
government's interest in preventing consumer fraud that was alleg-
edly served by the advertising ban.
Application of the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Advertising of
Legal Services
The Bates Court focused on the first amendment issue that it
reserved in the Virginia Pharmacy footnote. "s The issue, however,
was stated more narrowly: whether a lawyer's truthful advertise-
ment concerning the availability and price of routine legal services
can be prohibited by the state. Despite limiting the issue, the Court
applied the balancing test with a broader definition of advertising
in mind. It did not, for example, limit the application of Bates to
the newspaper medium nor did it forbid the use of creative advertis-
ing techniques. 9 This broader analysis may be due to the fact that,
with the exception of Justice Rehnquist, the only substantial objec-
tion of the dissenters was to the price element and not to advertising
per se.7° The issue was decided within the context of the consumer's
right to the free flow of commercial information." While it is argua-
66. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771-72 n.24 (1976).
67. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Virginia Pharmacy, argued that the majority did not
use the traditional protected/unprotected analysis but looked to see if the legislature had
acted rationally by eliminating greater harms that it produced. Id. at 781. See Konigsberg v.
State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943); Comment, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: An Emerging Doctrine, 5
HOFSTHA L. REV. 655, 665-66 (1976); Comment, Advertising and the Legal Profession: An
Analysis of the Requirements of the Sherman Act and the First Amendment, 6 U.C.L.A.-
ALAS. L. REV. 67, 87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Advertising and the Legal
Profession].
68. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
69. The Court stated, "[W]e note that appellee's criticism of advertising by attorneys
does not apply with much force to some of the basic factual content of advertising. . . We
recognize, however, that an advertising diet limited to such spartan fare [as DR 2-102(A)(6)
(1976)] would provide scant nourishment." 97 S.Ct. at 2700-01.
70. Instead of a 5-4 vote, there would have been an 8-1 majority. Justices Burger, Powell,
and Stewart see price as the critical factor. Their arguments conclude that since price adver-
tising has a greater potential to mislead the public, the balance tips in favor of a restrictive
rule. 97 S.Ct. at 2710 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 2713 (Powell
and Stewart, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71. 97 S.Ct. at 2699. This was also expressed in the Arizona Supreme Court decision of
Bates:
More fundamentally there is involved the right of the public as consumers and
citizens to know about the activities of the legal profession. Obviously the informa-
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ble that a distinct constitutional right was involved," the Court
perceived the case as related to Virginia Pharmacy rather than
Bigelow. Thus, commercial speech was affirmed in its more mun-
dane sense.
Arrayed against the consumer interest in the free flow of commer-
cial information were a number of justifications offered to support
the ban. The Court addressed all the classical reasons given by the
legal profession: the adverse effect on professionalism; the inher-
ently misleading nature of attorney advertising; the adverse effect
on the administration of justice; the undesirable economic effects of
advertising; the adverse effect on the quality of service; and the
difficulties of enforcement. These justifications and their factual
bases are worth review for they will reappear in defining the inter-
ests that justify permissible state regulations after Bates.
Professional Dignity
The bar's strongest argument was that advertising would have an
adverse impact on professional dignity.73 Supporters of the ban
argued that the public would lose respect for lawyers if they sought
financial gain rather than the achievement of justice. The Supreme
Court found the "connection between advertising and the erosion of
true professionalism" to be severely strained74 since few lawyers
deceive themselves that this is not a lucrative profession.7" More-
over, the Code already requires disclosure of the commercial re-
tion of what lawyers charge is important for private economic decisions by those in
need of legal services. Such information is also helpful, perhaps indispensable, to
the formation of an intelligent opinion by the public on how well the legal system
is working and whether it should be regulated or even altered.
In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 402, 555 P.2d 640, 648-49 (1976) (Holohan, J., dissenting). While
consumer interest analysis is derived from Virginia Pharmacy, the factual situation in Bates
was different. In Virginia Pharmacy, the consumers were the party plaintiff; in Bates the
interest was raised by the speaker as plaintiff. See Note, Consumer Right to Know, supra
note 49, at 75-76. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). The Court also recognized the right of the pharmacist as
speaker: "that the advertiser's interest is a purely economic one...hardly disqualifies him
from protection under the first amendment." Id. at 762.
72. The constitutionally protected right of access to the courts, NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963), or the right to legal counsel, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), may
be involved.
73. See text accompanying notes 5 through 9 supra; Semler v. Oregon Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935); L. Jeffers, Institute on Advertising in the Legal
Profession, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 620 (1976); Comment, Advertising and the Legal Profession
supra note 67, at 67.
74. 97 S.Ct. at 2701.
75. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 31, at 516; cf. E. Smith, Canon 2, 48 Trxx. L. REv.
285, 288 (1970) (participation in public programs).
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lationship to the client.7" Since respect for the lawyer is deter-
mined chiefly by how he handles his client's legal matters, it is
questionable whether a price ban has any significant influence on
the profession's image."
The Inherently Misleading Nature of Attorney Advertising
Another argument in support of the ban was that the advertising
of legal services would be inherently misleading. It was argued that
it was impossible to establish a meaningful product-to-price rela-
tionship where the product was a service and not a standardized
good." Because the public could not determine the exact nature of
the services needed, they could be misled by a price quotation. The
Court rejected these arguments as unpersuasive. Advertising does
not provide a complete guide to the selection of an attorney nor does
it reflect the varied detail of legal services. But while recognizing
this, the Court found that the alternative left the client with even
less information with which to select an attorney." The bar's pater-
nalistic approach, according to the Court, presupposed a public too
unsophisticated to realize the limits of advertising and unable to
deal with correct but incomplete information. 0
Rather than continue the ban, the Court placed the burden on the
organized bar to educate the consumer about the nature of legal
services." This education should include defining "routine" legal
services such as were at issue in Bates. This obligation to define
routine services in a non-misleading manner bothered some mem-
76. EC 2-19 states in part: "As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed, it is
desirable that he reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to
be made."
77. Indeed, the ban may have an adverse effect on the profession's image since disen-
chantment with lawyers lies in part with their failure to reach out into the community. 97
S.Ct. 2702; Branca & Steinberg, supra note 31, at 516 n.223; Recent Developments in Attor-
neys Fees, 29 VAND. L. REv. 685, 707 (1976); Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, supro
note 9, at 1190.
78. This argument was advanced on the distinction made in the Virginia Pharmacy foot-
note. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
79. 97 S.Ct. 2704. See Martyn, supra note 29, at 172 n.28; A. Morrison, Institute on
Advertising within the Legal Profession, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 609, 617 (1976); Restraints on
Advertising, supra note 8, at 1155; Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, supra note 9, at
1190; cf. J. Wilson, Madison Avenue, Meet the Bar, 61 A.B.A.J. 586 (1975) (rationale for
advertising).
80. "In any event we view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of
public ignorance." 97 S.Ct. at 2704. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
81. 97 S.Ct. at 2704. Part of the Task Force report recommended such an educational
campaign. See note 138 infra; cf. W. Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services Better
Known, 62 A.B.A.J. 855 (1976) (suggested approaches); E. Cheatham, A Lawyer When
Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Class, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 973, 976 (1963).
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bers of the Court 2 and conceivably poses the greatest problem for
the bar. The Court believed the potential harm of inexplicit defini-
tion, however, was outweighed by other factors. First, defining the
product-to-price relationship would not be too difficult a task for a
profession that had already established a minimum fee schedule. 3
Second, people generally do not use lawyers unless confronted with
a particular legal problem. While they may not know the detail of
the task, they are usually aware of the generalized nature of the
service to be pefformed.54 Less onerous methods than a total ban can
avoid possible misleading effects. If a range of prices were to appear
in an advertisement or if it described situations that would not be
covered, consumers would at least be able to make the initial deci-
sion to use a lawyer. 5 A binding agreement as to price could be
reached at the initial consultation. The Court also noted that adver-
tisement is not misleading where the attorney does the necessary
work at the advertised price." This is in effect a self imposed defini-
tion of routine services since lawyers would only advertise fees for
those services which they consider so ordinary that the work could
be done at a set fee. Finally, the advertising lawyer may elect not
to include prices at all. 7 Although this type of advertisement is
narrower than the Bates holding, it appears to be an alternative that
the individual lawyer could choose. The Court did not go beyond
holding that the particular contents of the Bates advertisement
were not misleading; however, it left the evaluation of these options
to the discretion of the bar.8
82. 97 S.Ct. at 2710 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated that since
the service was never standardized, price advertising could never give an accurate picture.
Thus. price advertising for "routine services" could become "a trap for the unwary."
83. 97 S.Ct. at 2703; cf.; R. Arnould and R. Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished,
57 A.B.A.J. 655, 658 (1971) (sample fee schedule).
84. Price information may also encourage the preventative use of lawyers since people now
do not use their services because of an exaggerated idea of the fee. A. Morrison, Institute on
Advertising Within the Legal Profession, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 609, 610 (1976); Recent Develop-
ments in Attorney's Fees, 29 VAND. L. REV. 685, 709 (1976).
85. Most people do not use lawyers because they have no way of finding the best attorney
for their particular problem or they over-estimate the cost of legal services. See M. FREEDMAN,
LAWYERS ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 117 (1975); W. Smith, Making the Availability of
Legal Services Better Known, 62 A.B.A.J. 855, 858 (1976); E. Cheatham, A Lawyer When
Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Class, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 975 (1963); A. Morrison,
Institute on Advertising Within the Legal Profession, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 609, 610-11 (1976).
Both of these difficulties would be overcome by the type of public information exemplified
by the Bates ad.
86. 97 S.Ct. at 2703. This was adopted as part of the recent amendments. See note 123
infra.
87. In the July 3, 1977 edition of the Los Angeles Times, 88 attorneys advertised. Only
eight listed price but almost all listed the general field of law in which they practiced. See 63
A.B.A.J. 1065 (1977).
88. 97 S.Ct. at 2709.
[Vol. 9
Advertising Legal Services
Adverse Effect on the Administration of Justice
By arguing that advertising has an adverse effect on the adminis-
tration of justice the inconsistency of Canon 200 becomes apparant.
The historical justification is that advertising has the undesirable
effect of stirring up litigation and encouraging the assertion of
fraudulent claims. The Bates Court rejected the notion of litigation
as an evil, 0 recognizing instead that it is the purpose of the judicial
system to vindicate individual rights. The Court deemed the ban a
likely burden on access to the courts and thus contrary to the legal
profession's obligation' to make counsel available. Advertising is
the "traditional mechanism" for suppliers to inform purchasers of
availability. 2 The Court found no basis for the argument that ad-
vertising would increase fraudulent claims. 3 Even assuming such a
relationship the Court felt disciplinary methods other than the ad-
vertising ban were more appropriate remedies. 4
Economic Effects of Advertising
Much of the advertising debate focused on its projected effect on
the price of legal services. Proponents of the ban argued that the
increased overhead of advertising would be passed on to the client
in the form of higher fees . 5 Opponents of the ban argued that it
increased the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost attorney of
acceptable ability; thus, the normal incentive to lower prices was
not present. Because the ban had existed for so long, there was
little evidence to support either hypothesis. With the justification
89. See text accompanying notes 17 through 19 supra.
90. 97 S.Ct. at 2705. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963). Branca & Steinberg,
supra note 31, at 515.
91. 97 S.Ct. at 2705.
92. "Instead attorneys have a professional duty to stir up litigation when they are acting
to advise people, who may be ignorant of their rights, to seek justice in the courts." M.
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 118 (1975).
93. 97 S. Ct. at 2704-05 n.31. See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 31, at 515; Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, supra note 9, at 1187.
94. This may be the strongest refutation of the argument that the current ban serves a
compelling state interest. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 768 (1976). See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 31, at 511 n.200;
Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, supra note 9, at 1188.
95. 97 S.Ct. at 2705. The ban may increase price, "If so, it may deprive consumers of an
alternative product that they might rationally want: low-priced, low-quality legal services."
Restraints on Advertising, supra note 8, at 1166.
96. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 768 (1976); R. Hummel, Antitrust Problems in Industry Codes of Advertising, Standardi-
zation, and Seals of Approval, 13 ANTITRUST BuLL. 607 (1968); Martyn, supra 29, at 175-77;
Comment, Bar Restrictions on Dissemination of Information About Legal Services, 22
U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 483, 510 (1974).
97. 97 S.Ct. at 2706. One study suggests that advertising lowers prices by 25%. See L.
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so speculative, the Court found itself unwilling to uphold the ban
on this basis, preferring to rely on the demonstrated price-
depressing effect of advertising in other businesses.
Adverse Effect on Quality of Service
It has been a longstanding concern that lawyers, if allowed to
advertise, would use improper means to keep their prices low. 8 Al-
though permitting states to regulate claims as to quality of individ-
ual service,99 the Bates Court found advertising was not a substan-
tial factor in the quality of legal service delivery. As the Court had
previously stated in Virginia Pharmacy, "[tihere is no claim that
the advertising ban in any way prevents the cutting of corners."'' 1
The ban may have nothing to do with the quality of services except
to enable the low-quality lawyer to make unreasonable profits in
relation to his skill. At any rate, it could not be assumed that low
cost services were identical to low quality services; therefore the
Court decided that the informed consumer, looking out for his own
self interest, should be be able to make this distinction. 0
Difficulties of Enforcement
The same bar that extolled the dignity of the profession antici-
pated that misrepresentation would be so prevalent that any regula-
tion short of the ban would be impossible to enforce.102 The Supreme
Court found this to be an incongruous argument. Even if the bar
could not enforce advertising regulations, and it appears that the
threat of discipline is not that persuasive," 3 the consumer still has
other remedies. Because the Court was looking for the least intrusive
means to protect the consumer interest,'04 the advertising ban could
Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 337, 344
(1972).
98. H. DRINKER, LEL EwMcs 126 (1953). The "quality" standard may also be an excuse
to limit supply, thus preserving the economic well-being of the profession.
99. 97 S.Ct. at 2700. The distinction between the lawyer's advertising the quality of his
particular skills and the effect of advertising on the overall quality of the profession's services
must be noted. The latter is the concern here.
100. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
101. 97 S.Ct. at 2706. Such an assertion of low cost equalling low quality services was
undermined by the fixed fee schedule of appellee's own prepaid Legal Services Program.
Accord, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 769 (1976).
102. It was urged that a period of time after Bates be used to assess the course of advertis-
ing without regulations. In the interim period prior to the adoption of the most recent amend-
ments, the anticipated flood of ad ,ertising did not materialize.
103. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 31, at 511 n.200.
104. See note 41 supra. Because the Court is looking for compelling state interests, there
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not stand on this ground.
The Court found that the state's interest based on these argu-
ments was not sufficiently compelling to warrant suppression of all
advertising by attorneys."'5 The real concern of the Court was not
whether advertisement by attorneys was within the scope of the first
amendment, but rather what was the nature of permissible state
regulation.' 0
The Supreme Court has long recognized the power of the states
to regulate the professions.'"7 Although finding Arizona's ban on
advertising excessive, the Court did not rule out all regulation.
Speech that is false, deceptive or misleading is of course subject to
restraint. 00 Since the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services and because advertising is a calculated form of speech, the
Court applied a stricter standard when analyzing this type of
speech. To prevent deception of consumers, even certain truthful
claims warrant restraint because of their potential to mislead.'"9 As
an example, the Court used claims as to quality of service because
they are not susceptible of measurement or verification. Neverthe-
less, it stopped short of stating that such claims were outside consti-
tutional protection." The Court declared that many of the prob-
lems in defining the boundary of non-deceptive advertising re-
mained to be worked out, issuing an invitation to the bar to play a
must be a close means/ends fit.
105. 97 S.Ct. at 2707.
106. Justice Powell noted during oral argument of Bates that
[tihe delivery of legal services in our country is obviously defective... I hope you
have time to address, not just the bare bones issue of whether or not there can be
advertising-I don't perceive that as the basic issue in the case. The question is
what limits, rationally, fairly, constitutionally may be imposed...
To Advertise or Not to Advertise, 63 A.B.A.J. 341, 344 (1977). While Bates was the first case
to reach the Supreme Court, similar cases were being heard throughout the country. These
courts found first amendment violations, while the Arizona court found none. See Health
Systems Agency of N. Va. v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va.
1976); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D.
Va. 1976); Jacoby v. California State Bar, 45 U.S.L.W. 2529.
107. This power was reaffirmed by Bates:
[Tihe regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State's power to
protect the public. Indeed, this Court in Goldfarb acknowledged that the interest
of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to
the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically
been 'officers of the courts.'
Id. at 2698.
108. 97 S.Ct. at 2708. See note 40 supra.
109. Id. at 2709. This reasoning cuts a fine line between the consumer's ability to put a
legal advertisement in proper perspective (as was used to invalidate the justification of the
inherently misleading nature of advertising) and the public's lack of sophistication about
legal services (that was used to rationalize stricter regulations).
110. Id.
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special role in defining that boundary."1 The Court also stated that,
as with other forms of speech, reasonable restrictions as to time,
place, and manner could be imposed. "' Of particular concern were
problems of advertising on the electronic media." ' As with claims
of quality, such advertisement was not precluded but left for special
consideration by the bar."'
ABA RESPONSE
Prior to the announcement of the Bates decision, the ABA, sen-
sing the mood of the Court, organized the Task Force on Lawyer
Advertising. "' Alternative draft regulations were prepared, reflect-
ing the differing approaches of the bar's members. Proposal A, the
more conservative approach adopted by the House of Delegates, is
described as "regulatory""' and specifically describes the permitted
forms of advertising. Most significantly, Proposal A retains the
Code's categories of information that can be published." 7 However,
to comply with the narrow Bates holding as to price information"'
it includes contingency fee information, range for certain services,
hourly rates, and charges for "specific legal services the description
of which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive."" 9 Proposal
111. This recognizes the special relationship between the organized bar and the state
agencies. While the regulation balances state interests, it is the private bar association that
responds to the case. The ABA is an advisory body, but by responding with a set of guidelines,
it hoped to avoid a lack of conformity that would work to the detriment of the consumer. ABA
Annual Meeting, 46 U.S.L.W. 2089.
112. 97 S.Ct. at 2709. See note 42 supra.
113. Id. See note 135 infra.
114. Id.
115. The Task Force was established by the ABA Board of Governors on June 7, 1977.
The Bates decision was announced on June 27, 1977. The Task Force met promptly thereafter
and from time to time until the annual meeting of the ABA in Chicago. 46 U.S.L.W.1.
116. ABA Rep. of the Bd. of Governors to the House of Delegates, 5.
117. See note 21 supra.
118. 97 S.Ct. at 2709. Because the Court did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, only
this particular factual situation is affected. See note 38 supra.
119. DR 2-101(B) as revised, provides in part:
(22) Contingent fee rates . . . provided that the statement discloses whether per-
centages are computed before or after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that the
specific fee within the range which will be charged will vary depending upon the
particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without
obligation to an estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in print
size equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rates, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee charged
will depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the particular
matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled to without obligation
an estimate of the fee likely to be charged . .;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which would not be
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A ethical considerations and disciplinary rules reflect concern that
advertisments convey the maximum amount of relevant price infor-
mation without being misleading.12 0 Self-laudation and advertise-
ments as to quality of service are still forbidden. 2' The disciplinary
rules require that where any price information is given, a disclosure
statement in the advertisement must warn that a client is entitled
without obligation to an estimate of the fee to be charged.22 To
prevent escalating prices between advertisement and billing, the
lawyer is bound to render the service for no more than the advertised
fee.12
3
Proposal B, labelled "directive," does not restrict the content of
advertising, and its antifraud approach prevents the attorney only
from using any form of public communication containing a false,
fraudulent, misleading or deceptive statement or claim. 24 In a back
door fashion, however, Proposal B imposes the same fee information
limits as Proposal A since all fee information other than that per-
misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that the
quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services
described and that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of
the fee likely to be charged ....
46 U.S.L.W.. 5 (Aug. 23, 1977).
120. The new EC 2-2 states in part: "[Aldvertisements . . . should be motivated by a
desire to educate the public to an awareness of legal needs and to provide information relevant
to the selection of the most appropriate counsel rather than to obtain publicity for particular
lawyers." EC 2-8 states in part: "Advertisements ... should be formulated to convey only
information that is necessary to make an appropriate selection."
121. The new EC 2-9 states in part:
The lack of sophistication on the part of many members of the public concerning
legal services, the importance of the interests affected by the choice of a lawyer and
prior experience with unrestricted lawyer advertising, require that special care be
taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the public and to assure that the information
set forth in any advertising is relevant to the selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must
be mindful that the benefits of lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and
accuracy. Examples of information in lawyer advertising that would be deceptive
include misstatements of fact, suggestions that the ingenuity or prior record of a
lawyer rather than the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely to deter-
mine the result, inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a lawyer, and repre-
sentations concerning the quality of service, which cannot be measured or verified.
DR 2-101 (A) states in part: "A lawyer shall not ... use or participate in the use of any form
of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory
or unfair statement."
122. See note 119 supra. Sections 23, 24, and 25 all require that the lawyer give an
estimate without obligation to the client.
123. DR 2-101(E) now states: "If a lawyer advertises a fee for a service the lawyer must
render that service for no more than the fee advertised. In addition, sec. F (printed matter)
and sec. G (broadcast material) require that the lawyer be bound to the advertised fee for a
period until the succeeding issue or for one month."
124. DR 2-101(A) states in part: "A lawyer shall not .. use or participate in the use of
any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive
statement or claim."
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mitted in DR 2-101(A)(6) 25 is classified as deceptive.' Proposal B
defines the standards of conduct more clearly than does "A," and
by listing them in the disciplinary rules rather than in the ethical
considerations, renders them binding. 27 Although the disciplinary
procedure is not changed in either proposal, Proposal B contains
more commentary 8 on ethical behavior since its effectiveness de-
pends solely on disciplinary proceedings. The House of Delegates
adopted Proposal A as its official position; 29 however, it decided to
circulate both proposals to the state courts and state regulatory
agencies upon recommendation from the Board of Governors. 3 '
Both proposals deal with time, place, and manner regulations
beyond the narrow scope of the Bates holding. 3' While Bates could
be limited to newspaper advertising, even Justice Powell in dissent
noted that there was no valid distinction among print media.' 32 The
125. See notes 21 and 119 supra.
126. DR 2-101(B) states in part:
Without limitation a false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive statement or claim
includes a statement or claim which:
(6) Relates to legal fees other than:
(a) A statement of the fee for an initial consultation;
(b) A statement of the fixed or contingent fee charged for a specific legal
service, the description of which would not be misunderstood;
(c) A statement of the range of fees for specifically described legal services,
provided there is a reasonable disclosure of all relevant variables and consid-
erations so that the statement would not be misunderstood or be deceptive;
(d) A statement of specified hourly rates, provided the statement makes
clear that the total charge will vary according to the number of hours devoted
to the matter.
127. See note 17 supra.
128. EC 2-8A states in part:
The proper motivation for commercial publicity by lawyers lies in the need to
inform the public of the availability of competent, independent legal counsel . . .
Advertising marked by excesses of content, volume, scope or frequency or which
unduly emphasizes unrepresentative biographical information,* does not provide
that public benefit . . . . The use of media whose scope or nature clearly suggests
that the use is intended for self-laudation of the lawyer without concomitant benefit
to the public such as the use of billboards, electrical signs, sound trucks, or televi-
sion commercials distorts the legitimate use of informing the public and is clearly
improper.
EC 2-8B states in part:
Advertisements or public claims that convey an impression that the ingenuity of
the lawyer rather than the justice of the claim is determinative are similarly impro-
per. Statistical data or other information based on past performance or prediction
of future success is deceptive because it ignores important variables. Only factual
assertions, and not opinions, should be made in public communications.
129. See note 4 supra.
130. ABA Rep. of the Bd. of Governors to the House of Delegates, 1.
131. The statement of the issue did not mention newspaper advertising specifically; how-
ever, by refusing application of the overbreadth doctrine, that result would follow.
132. 97 S. Ct. at 2718 n.12 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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ABA precluded this potential issue by not limiting advertising only
to newspapers.' 3 Although not mandated by the decision, and not
included in the Task Force's preliminary drafts, radio advertising
is permitted. This is in apparent reaction to ABA public hearings
which disclosed that to significant numbers of the population the
electronic media was more accessible than the print media. 4 The
bar did not recommend use of television, recognizing that visual
media may present separate problems of image and monitoring.'35
However, a special section of both proposals allows television adver-
tising upon the approval of the state agency responsible for lawyer
regulation or consumer affairs. 3 '
Other recommendations were made to assure consumer protec-
tion. The ABA recommended the creation of a commission on adver-
tising, including members of consumer organizations, to monitor
advertising developments in other professions and state regulatory
responses to Bates. The commission would also be charged with
making recommendations as needs develop for amendments to the
advertising guidelines.'37 It also recommended forming a special
committee to study the feasibility of a nationwide institutional ad-
vertising program to educate consumers about the utility, cost, and
availability of legal services. 38
133. See notes 119 and 121 supra. Both proposals are framed in terms of public communi-
cation.
134. ABA Rep. of the Bd. of Governors to the House of Delegates, 6. Accord, Testimony
of J. Peter Dowd, Chrmn, Exec. Comm. for South Shore Legal Services Project in Chicago
(Aug. 4, 1977).
135. Id. at 6; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 586, aff'd without opinion 405 U.S. 100 (1971).
136. DR 2-101(C) of Proposal A states:
Any person desiring to expand the information authorized for disclosure in DR 2-
101(B), or to provide for its dissemination through other forums may apply to [the
agency having jurisdiction under state law]. Any such application shall be served
upon [the agencies having jurisdiction under state law over the regulation of the
legal profession and consumer matters] ....
DR 2-101(C) of Proposal B states in part:
A lawyer shall not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication
which:
(7) Utilizes television or until [the agency having jurisdiction under state law]
shall have determined that the use of such media is necessary in light of the existing
provisions of the Code, accords with standards of accuracy, reliability, and truthful-
ness, and would facilitate the process of informed selection of lawyers by potential
consumers of legal services.
In one pre-Bates action, it was decided to proscribe the use of electronic media even while
permitting advertising in general. See Lawscope, 63 A.B.A.J. 299 (1977).
137. ABA Rep, of the Bd. of Governors to the House of Delegates, 6.
138. Id. at 10. But see J. Hoffman, Industry Wide Codes of Advertising, Seals of Approval,
and Standards as Participated in by Trade Associations, 13 ANTrrRuST BULL. 595 (1968)
(problems with such activities).
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RESPONSES AFTER BATES & O'STEEN V. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA
The Bates case and the guidelines adopted in response to it raise
numerous questions. Foremost is whether the regulations pose first
amendment problems of prior restraint and content control. Of
more concern to the public, however, is whether the regulations
define "routine services" sufficiently to prevent deception and
whether advertising will lead to further changes in the delivery of
legal services.
Continuing First Amendment Problems
Since Proposal A limits permissible kinds of information, this
proscription more than any other raises first amendment concerns
of prior restraint and content control. 39 Proposal B, which follows
the traditionally approved formula of evaluating the speech after its
communication, does not share this problem. 4 " It is questionable,
however, whether Proposal A could be successfully challenged on
this basis. Regulations of speech are generally invalidated in cir-
cumstances where prior permission is required. " ' The Court has
found post-speech sanctions violative of the first amendment where
they have a "chilling effect" on the speech.' Arguably the regula-
tory limitations of Proposal A could constitute either type of re-
straint. However, as the Court noted, "[any concern that strict
requirements for truthfulness will undesirably inhibit spontaneity
seems inapplicable because commercial speech generally is calcu-
lated."'' One can conclude that the "before the fact" limits of Pro-
posal A's categories will not have the effect of preventing the speech
because of the economic benefit that is derived from advertising and
the protection of the public interest that outweighs any restraining
effects. Furthermore, the regulations in question are of a civil rather
than criminal nature and may be viewed as having a less restrictive
effect.' Actual discipline occurs "after the fact" in both proposals.
Finally, although a prior restraint regulation comes before the court
with a "heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,"'45 it
139. See notes 37 through 44 supra.
140. The difference between "A" and "B" is the difference between "No one says I can"
and "No one says I can't." The Court leans toward the latter because of the breadth given
the first amendment rights.
141. See note 44 supra.
142. Cf. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (indirect
means of controlling speech).
143. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
144. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
145. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); N.Y. Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971).
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is not unconstitutional per se. States have withstood prior restraint
challenges upon proving scrupulous use of the regulatory power and
careful administration of such regulations."6 Given the hearing pro-
cedures included in the Code, Proposal A, as well as Proposal B,
should survive constitutional scrutiny.
Closely related to prior restraint is government control over con-
tent through regulation. Regulation effecting speech may be ap-
proved where the restraint on content is incidental to the purpose
of the regulation. "7 If the purpose of the ABA guidelines is to meet
the narrow holding of Bates by providing price information, "8 the
new amendments do not constitute content control. Publication of
relevant fee information is clearly permitted.'49 On the other hand,
if the purpose is to allow as much advertising as possible without
misleading the public, the quality of service limitation may consti-
tute content control. The Supreme Court did not preclude this type
of advertising since it was not at issue in the Bates case. 5 " Where
this issue had arisen in the past, the Court had found that the
legitimate state interest in protecting consumers was sufficient to
justify such a ban.' However, in light of changing attitudes toward
consumer information and commercial speech, it is probable that
this issue will be addressed in the future. 5 ' The quality of the law-
yer's services is an important factor in evaluating an attorney. 3
Just as individuals prior to Bates had to rely on word of mouth for
price information, they are now forced to rely on it for indications
of quality. If the issue arises, the key will be whether the measure-
146. Law Students Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 157 (1971).
147. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
148. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
149. See note 119 supra.
150. The Bates and O'Steen ad made no claims as to quality of service. See note 24 supra.
151. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); Semler v. Oregon
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
152. If not directly, then it may be challenged indirectly, for as Justice Powell noted,
reasonableness of fees depends on both quantity and quality of services. 97 S. Ct. at 2714-15.
153. Restraints on Advertising, supra note 8, at 1149. Even with advertising, there is no
guarantee that such an evaluation will occur.
There is no easy answer to the fear that the public might choose attorneys on the
basis of their advertising programs rather than their reputations for professional
ability. It would of course be better if clients chose their lawyers on the basis of
competence. But to compare that happy situation with the one which would result
if advertising were allowed is misleading, because it is not at all clear that clients
currently select lawyers on the basis of competence, or that they could do so in the
absence of information which is blocked by the prevailing restrictions on advertis-
ing and solicitation. Non-deceptive advertising would at least increase the flow of
information.
Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, supra note 9, at 1190-91.
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ment or verification of skills is sufficiently precise to outweigh the
state interest in preventing fraud and deception of the public.
Definition of Routine Services
While the Supreme Court concluded that all advertising of legal
services is not inherently misleading, it focused on the nature of
"routine services" as the likely topic of advertisement. One of the
significant tasks of the bar will be to define routine services in such
a manner as to give leadership to its members and to prevent decep-
tion of the public.
Because the Court did not apply the overbreadth doctrine,' 4 argu-
ably the only services permitted to be advertised are those in the
Bates case: uncontested divorce or separation; uncontested adop-
tion; non-business, uncontested bankruptcy; and change of name.
Even price advertisements for these services were thought to be
potentially misleading by the dissenting members of the Court. 155
The majority of the Court, however, did not see this as a problem
nor did they view these services as an exhaustive list of advertising
subjects even though they recognized that only services similar to
these would lend themselves to fixed fees.'56 The Court was uncon-
cerned that the precise service in each task may be likely to vary.157
The ABA adopted an approach similar to that of the majority in
Bates. Not only is there no specific list of routine services in their
proposals but, like the Court, they also bumped ultimate responsi-
bility down to the next level-the state regulatory agency or the
individual practitioner.'58 This does not mean, however, that the
154. See note 38 supra.
155. In pointing out the problems with a price advertisement for the routine service of
"uncontested divorce," Justice Powell stated, at 97 S.Ct. 2713-14:
A potential client can be grievously mislead if he reads the advertised service as
embracing all of his possible needs. A host of problems are implicated by divorce.
They include alimony; support and maintenance for children; child custody; visita-
tion rights; interests in life insurance; community property, tax refunds, and tax
liabilities; and the disposition of other property rights. . . .The average lay person
simply has no feeling for which services are included in the packaged divorce, and
thus no capacity to judge the nature of the advertised product. As a result, the type
of advertisement before us inexcapably will mislead many who respond to it. In the
end it will promote distrust of lawyers ....
156. 97 S.Ct. at 2703. Factors in establishing price are: time involved, difficulty of the
problem, amount of interests involved, benefits sought by the client, attorney's professional
standing, attorney's opportunity cost, attitude of the profession toward the type of litigation,
responsibility assumed by the attorney, probability of success, necessity of counsel's service,
and client's ability to pay. Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57
A.B.A.J. 655 (1971). This type of price setting, however, assumes more complicated fact
situations than those addressed in the routine services of Bates.
157. 97 S.Ct at 2703.
158. ABA, Rep. of the Bd. of Governors to the House of Delegates, 6.
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Code amendments are without limits. Both proposals permit fixed
fee advertising of specified legal services where the "description...
would not be misunderstood or be deceptive . .,,,59The reasonable
man standard is adopted in both "A" and "B" to judge the potential
for deception in any given situation.'60 Provisions permitting hourly
rate and fixed fee advertisement in Proposal A also require notice
to the consumer that the actual fee may vary.' 6 ' Furthermore, as has
already been noted, the Code requires that the lawyer perform the
service if it is advertised at a fixed fee for not more than that fee.
In such circumstances, it does not matter whether the services ad-
vertised were routine or not.
While this area of the amendments will be a source of experimen-
tation by the bar, the guidelines place both definitional responsibil-
ity and liability on the advertising lawyer. It is more likely that
attorneys will place advertisements replete with caveats and dis-
claimers or even devoid of price quotations rather than depend on
an ABA list of routine services. This approach, even with the possi-
ble risk of litigation from clients, is the preferable route. To wait
until the ABA defines these services would be an unnecessary delay
for both the attorney who wishes to advertise and for the public who
needs the information.
Changes in the Profession
The permission of advertising may presage other changes in the
legal profession. Two areas are predominant: solicitation and spe-
cialization. The legal profession has traditionally held solicitation
in the same suspect realm as advertising.'62 Solicitation may suffer
the same perception problems as advertising did when it was de-
bated, depending on whether it is perceived as merely informing
persons of availability through personal contact or envisioned as
"ambulance chasers" plaguing the injured in emergency rooms. To
prevent harassment of injured parties, a solicitation ban may be
justified. Yet, under normal circumstances, a significant number of
159. In Proposal A, see DR 2-101(b)(25), at note 119 supra. In Proposal B, see DR 2-
101(B)(6)(b) at note 126 supra.
160. DR 2-101(B) in Proposal B states in part:
Without limitation a false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive statement or claim
includes a statement or claim which:
(7) Contains a representation or implication that is likely to cause an ordi-
nary prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived or fails to contain
reasonable warnings or disclaimers necessary to make a representation or
implication not deceptive.
161. See note 119 supra.
162. In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933).
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people have no way of meeting attorneys and would welcome the
contact.6 3 While the commercial speech doctrine has developed
through a series of advertising cases, the distinction between adver-
tising and solicitation may be too fine a line to draw, banning com-
pletely one form while permitting the other. Protection may also be
extended in another manner. Solicitation has been granted first
amendment protection when associated with the exercise of reli-
gious freedom. ' It is easy to argue, as was suggested in the analysis
of Bigelow,' 5 that this type of expression is necessary to protect a
distinct constitutional right of access to the courts. Given a case
involving solicitation of clients in a non-emergency situation, the
same balancing test that led to legal advertising may result in allow-
able, but regulated, solicitation.
The advertising decision may also accelerate the bar's move to-
ward specialization in both conscious and sub-conscious ways. It
appears from early reports that most attorneys are including their
area of practice, even more so than their fees, in their advertise-
ments. ' The ABA guidelines permit the inclusion of certified spe-
cialties in advertisements. Specialty information was permitted
prior to Bates but only in the Code-approved forms of yellow page
listings and law directories.' 7 An attorney who practices within a
general field of law but whose state does not grant certification may
identify his area of practice in an advertisement so long as official
certification is not implied.'6 8 This advertising may lead to further
specialization in practice. Where an attorney advertises his practice
in a given field of law, more individuals needing that type of service
are likely to become his clients. Over time, the attorney may devote
more of his attention to that subject area than would have occurred
without advertising, thus leading to greater individual specializa-
tion. In addition, the attorney may increasingly limit the nature of
his practice so as to achieve economies of scale through the use of
163. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 117 (1975); Smith, Making
the Availability of Legal Services Better Known, 62 A.B.A. J. 855, 858 (1976); Branca &
Steinberg, supra note 31, at 511.
164. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943). Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (solicitation for legal services).
165. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
166. See note 87 supra. This response to Bates prompted one state bar to issue their
proposed guidelines on specialization. Morrison, Field Advertising-Special Competence or
Ordinary Hucksterism? We Need a Specialization Rule Now, 66 ILL. BAR J. 78 (1977).
167. See note 21 supra.
168. EC 2-14 of Proposal A states in part: "If a lawyer discloses areas of law in which he
practices or to which he limits his practice, but is not certified in [the jurisdiction], he, and
the designation authorized in Ithe jurisdiction], should avoid any implication that he is in
tact certified."
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standardized forms and paralegal services. This would be particu-
larly true in the area of routine services such as those performed by
the Law Clinic of Bates and O'Steen."9 State licensing of specialties
may have to be accelerated to assure that those claiming abilities
actually have them.
CONCLUSION
The impact of Bates and O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona on the
practice of law will be felt more by the implementation of the ABA
guidelines than by the development of the case's constitutional doc-
trine. Certainly, the expansion of commercial speech to protect ad-
vertisements of services will quickly be used to support challenges
to advertising bans in other professions. "' But the real benefit to the
consumer depends on the pace and the extent to which the states
adopt the new guidelines. The decision gives the consumer a chance
to obtain information vital to the selection of a particular lawyer,
as well as to the initial decision to employ the services of an attor-
ney. It is hoped that the state bar associations will take enthusiastic
rather than grudging steps to support this recognized public inter-
est.
ANN FIELD DUKER
169. It was the conscious philosophy of the Bates & O'Steen Clinic to take only routine
matters, thus, assuring the economies of scale necessary to keep prices low. 97 S. Ct. at 2694.
170. In Louisiana Consumers League, Inc. v. Louisiana State Bd. of Optometry Examin-
ers, 46 U.S.L.W. 2117 (1977), Bates was used successfully to challenge a state ban on eyeglass
price advertising.
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